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What is a Remittance?
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History of Failed Decentralization
Decentralization: the delegation of power from a 
central authority to regional and local authorities 
(Merriam-Webster).
● Fiscal Coordination Law 1978
○ Strengthened State-Local revenue 
sharing
● Constitutional amendment aimed at local 
governments (Article 15)





● Remittances make-up 2% of 
Mexico’s GDP (World Bank 2016).
● In 2016 remittances reached an all-
time high of US$26.97 billion (BBVA 
Bancomer 2017). 
● In 2000 over a million Mexican 




● Municipal revenues only .2% of 
Mexico’s GDP.
● Own-source revenues are only 
7 percent of the total municipal 
revenue portfolio (Smith 2015).
● Property tax lowest in OECD 
countries (OECD 2015).
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● Spent on “Daily 
Consumption” 
● Damaging economic and 
social development
2nd
● Enable “capital” and 
“professional” investments
● Rudimentary institution for 
asset building and risk 
(Canales 2000; Corona 2001;Delgado Wise 
and Rodrigues 2001 ).
3rd 
● Success of remittances 
constrained by overall 
economic context of country.
● Exacerbate impacts of 
macroeconomic structural 
policies in North and South
(Adams and Cuecha
2010; Hanson and Woodruff 2003; 
Edwards, and Ureta 2003; Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo 209;
Valero and Trevino 2010; Woodruff 2007; 
Ambrious 2012).
1st 
(De Hass 2010; Durand,
Kandel, and Parrado 1996, 424; Wise and 
Marquez Covarrubias 2008).






1. Is there a relationship between 
remittance income and municipal 
tax revenues throughout the 31 
states?
2. Does the relationship change 
when comparing northern-border 
states to southern states?
Research Questions
Hypotheses:
Ho: No relationship exists between 
remittance and municipal tax revenue. 
Ho: No difference exists between 




● Time series 2003-2016
○ Municipal tax-revenue aggregated 
at state level
○ Remittance data by State
○ Adjusted to per capita terms
○ Dichotomous variable referencing 
Northern-Border States
Y(Muni Tax Revenue)=a+b1X1 (Remittance Income)+b2X2 (Northern-Border State)




○ Banco de México
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Existing Research 
● Indirect and multiplier effects in local economy and overall fiscal composition 
of government (Durand, Parrado, Massey 1996).
● State level impacts of VAT and show remittance expand size of state (SInger 
2012)
● Three-for-One Program allow municipalities to change spending behavior 
according to electoral cycle and underutilize debt capacity (Simpser, Duquette-
Rury Hernandez, Ibarra (2016). 
● Remittances crowd-out municipal federal transfers (Ambrosius 2016)
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Remittances, P value 2.43478E-06 




-Muni. Tax Revenue MX$120
SOUTH’S MEDIAN
-Remittance MX$187











df SS MS F
Significance
F
Regression 2 1384196.558 692098.3 54.82662 6.11E-22











Intercept 270.3192 8.287843254 32.61635 1.8E-118 254.0296 286.6088 254.0296 286.6088
Remittances per capita -0.1159 0.01919298 -6.03889 3.35E-09 -0.15363 -0.07818 -0.15363 -0.07818
Northern Border Reference -103.067 13.83843606 -7.44788 5.22E-13 -130.266 -75.8678 -130.266 -75.8678
Prediction




Y(Muni Tax Revenue)= 270+ -.11X1 (Remittance Income)+ (-103)X2 (N.State)
● For every MX$1 tax revenue MX-$.12 in remittance.
● For every MX$1 in tax revenues, Northern Border 
states receives MXN$103 less. 
Final Remarks
Findings
● Remittance may act as a subsidy to municipal tax 
● Northern-Border states are not better tax collectors and receive significantly more remittance income
Limitations
● Include Immigration as a control variable
● Leave in the municipal richness
Implications
● Further explore remittances on northern-border
● Explore property tax frameworks
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